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Texas Law Review
child and the parent, the Borough should have to prove only that the
curfew actually fosters the well-being of the child and the family. 4 The
Bykofsky court, however, did not require any evidence to that effect,
but instead deferred to the Borough's judgment. When an ordinance
threatens important familial prerogatives, spontaneous deference to
governmental interests becomes impermissible.
Until the Supreme Court establishes more helpful guidelines for
analyzing the relationship between the constitutional rights of adults
and juveniles, the lower courts should remain abreast of the trend
favoring expansion of juvenile liberties. Courts should formulate their
own thoughtful analytic criteria. When judges determine that juveniles
have as great an interest in a particular right as adults have, they should
not hestitate to demand that only the weightiest governmental interest
would suffice to deprive juveniles of their freedom.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SCHOOL DESEGREGATION-FAILURE To
REVAMP SEGREGATED SCHOOL DISTRICT ATTENUATES THE Milli-
ken v. Bradley BARRIER To FEDERAL INTERDISTRICT REME-
DIES. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 374 (1975).
Kinloch School District, small and all-black, adjoins the predomi-
nantly white Berkeley and Ferguson-Florissant School Districts in St.
Louis County, Missouri. Kinloch and Berkeley had comprised one dis-
trict until 1937, when they split along racial lines.1 In 1971 the United
States, pursuant to Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 and the
ment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 232 (1973); Note, State Intrusion into
Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. Rnv. 1383, 1392-94 (1974).
54. See generally Note, supra note 53, at 1394-1409.
[Note by Bruce A. Budner.]
1. The Missouri constitution had required the original Kinloch School District to
operate segregated schools. Mo. CONsr. art. IX, § 3 (1875). A vote of the white
residents to incorporate their portion of the district as the City of Berkeley, despite
protests from the newly isolated black residents, induced the racial dissociation. The
school district structure mandated by state law has thus inevitably reflected the county's
dualistic residential pattern. United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739, 742-43 (E.D.
Mo. 1973) (findings of fact and conclusions of law), 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.)
(final order), afrd in pertinent part, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. CL
374 (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6(a) (1970).
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fourteenth amendment,3 commenced a school desegregation action
against the State of Mfissouri, the State and county boards of education,
the three school districts, and several public officials. The district court
concluded that all the defendants had unlawfully maintained Kinloch as
a racially segregated school district.4 After reviewing various proposed
desegregation plans, the court ordered Ferguson to annex Kinloch and
Berkeley." Affirmed in pertinent part. A federal court can order the
implementation of an interdistrict remedy where adjacent school dis-
tricts and the state have maintained a de jure6 segregated district for
racially discriminatory reasons.7
Since Brown v. Board of Educations the task of implementing
desegregation has troubled the federal courts. Aware of the variegated
3. "[INor shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see note 8 infrq.
4. 363 F. Supp. at 746-50.
5. The district court approved the three-district plan submitted by the State and
county defendants as "the least disruptive alternative which is educationally sound,
administratively feasible, and which promises to achieve at least the minimum amount of
desegregation that is constitutionally required." United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp.
1058, 1059 (E.D. Mo. 1975). The plan envisions a new composite district that would be
84% white (Berkeley and Ferguson are presently 59% and 95% white respectively).
Approximately 2000 additional students will be bused throughout the districts. See Brief
for Appellee at 21-23, United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975). The
trial court rejected a Kinloch-Berkeley merger as ineffective and discarded a proposed
Ferguson-Kinloch annexation as financially unsound. United States v. Missouri, 515
F.2d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 374 (1975).
6. De jure segregation consists of both legislatively mandated segregation, which
existed in some states prior to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
segregation intentionally bred by public school officials. De facto segregation, on the
other hand, embraces all other racial imbalances arising from unintended, nonofficial
sources. For an excellent explication of the distinction between the two terms, see
Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972). See also Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d
178, 180-82 (6th Cir. 1974); Note, De Facto School Segregation and the "State Action"
Requirement: A Suggested New Approach, 48 IND. LJ. 304 (1973).
7. The Eighth Circuit also approved the lower court's directive for tax funding of
the new school district, despite the State constitutional requirement that the electorate
authorize increased tax assessments. 515 F.2d at 1372-73; see Mo. CONST. art. X, §
11(c). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell voted to grant certiorari on this issue. 96
S. Ct. at 374. The court of appeals did overturn the prescribed maximum tax rate on the
ground that the district judge should have deferred to the State and county officials'
recommendations. 515 F.2d at 1373.
On remand the district court has delayed implementation of its desegregation plan
until the beginning of the 1976-1977 school year because of complications inherent in
the consolidation. The Eighth Circuit abided this ruling. United States v. Missouri, 523
F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1975).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown, the progenitor of school desegregation law,
furnishes the touchstone for determining fourteenth amendment violations. Basically,
the Brown Court decided that state-mandated segregation of public schools denies black
students equal protection of the laws. Subsequently, the Court expanded the duty of
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problems of school administration, educational policy, economics, and
politics, the Supreme Court has attempted to define generally the limits
of federal remedial power in desegregation cases. Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown II)9 prescribed traditional equitable remedies, the
flexibility of which would accommodate a vaiiety of public and private
interests. 10 The Court charged district courts to evaluate the relevant
social, administrative, and legal obstacles in determining whether school
authorities had advanced good faith efforts to eradicate segregation.
Defendants, however, needed only to proceed "with all deliberate
speed,""1 a formula that in practice licensed postponement of relief.' 2
-Not until Green v. County School Board3 did the Supreme Court
impose upon school officials an affirmative duty to dismantle de jure
segregated school systems. To effectuate Green, federal courts tran-
scended their evaluative posture and actively compelled school boards to
adopt structural modifications that promised to maximize integration.' 4
Later, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 5 endorsed
specific equitable remedies, including mandatory busing, the alteration
of attendance zones, and the utilization of racial quotas as guides in
shaping decrees. The fundamental principle governing remedies within
singular school districts emerged from Swann-confined: only by the
bounds of feasibility, federal courts possess plenary authority to redress
school officials to desegregate dual school systems. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (failure to fulfill that duty may require
exercise of the broad remedial authority of federal courts); Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (the fear of "white flight" does not justify a transfer
provision that perpetuates segregation); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968) (school officials shoulder an affirmative duty to pursue whatever means neces-
sary to convert a dual school system into a unitary one free of racial discrimination);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (public hostility, if encouraged by state action,
does not excuse delay in desegregating).
9. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (the implementation decision).
10. Id. at 300. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971), in which Chief Justice Burger observed thaat desegregation decrees should
vindicate constitutional rights by balancing the relevant individual and collective interests.
11. 349 U.S. at 301.
12. See Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64
COLUM. L. Rav. 193, 203-12 (1964), & cases cited therein.
13. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) ("free transfer"
provisions of desegregation plan invalidated because some schools remained segregated;
the Court instead recommended a "feeder system" through which junior high schools
would draw students from specified elementary schools); Coppedge v. Franklin County
Bd. of Educ., 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1968) ("freedom of choice" plan for pupil
assignment overthrown in favor of either a unitary system of geographic attendance
zones or consolidation of grades or schools).
15. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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de jure segregation. 6 While stressing the inherent breadth of equitable
power, the Swann Court delimited the judiciary's remedial faculties-
judicial authority "may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional
violation" (i.e., de jure segregation), and "the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy."'1 7  Within these bounds federal
courts enjoy broad discretionary power to fashion appropriate reme-
dies.' 8
Interdistrict relief represents the next and perhaps final step in the
expansion of federal courts' equitable powers to combat school segrega-
tion. Until recently litigation has focused on the singular district, within
which courts could readily design effective remedies.' 9 Increased racial
polarization of America's major metropolitan areas into black urban
cores and white suburbs, however, has rendered unsatisfactory the soli-
tary integration of city schools. Forced integration of majority-black
school systems on a single district level merely perpetuates racial imbal-
ance in inner city schools by inducing "white flight" to the suburbs
or private schools.2° Consequently, in the absence of legislative solutions,
desegregation decrees must traverse district boundaries if urban schools
are ever to reflect more closely the racial composition of the metroplitan
community.2 '
16. The Swann Court adjudged a 1.5% budget hike and a thirty-five minute bus ride
for students to be reasonable. Id. at 30. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402
U.S. 33, 37 (1971). See generally Comment, Milliken v. Bradley in Historical Perspec-
tive: The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 799, 804-05 (1974).
17. 402 U.S. at 16. Although the Court acknowledged the limits to judicial
remedial powers, it perceived "no fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines" for
ascertaining those limits. Id. at 28. Apparently, courts must determine the substantive
bounds to their authority on a case-by-case basis. Its reticent tone notwithstanding, the
Swann decision notably vitalized the federal judiciary's desegregative role by means of its
emphasis on achieving actual integration rather than the merely nonracial grouping of
students. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. RFv. 697, 704-05 (1971).
18. Before courts may intervene, they must discern a constitutional wrong attributa-
ble to educational authorities. In every case, however, judicial control will fall short of
the plenary powers enjoyed by the defaulting officials. See 402 U.S. at 15-16.
19. See Note, Merging Urban and Suburban School Systems, 60 GEo. L.J. 1279,
1293 (1972); text accompanying note 16 supra.
20. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 800-02 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Comment, Interdistrict Segregation: Finding a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
23 AM. U.L. REv. 785 (1974); Note, supra note 19, at 1279. See also Bradley v.
School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1061-66 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
412 U.S. 92 (1973).
21. Residentially segregated metropolitan areas must either educate their suburban
white and urban minority children together, or abandon the concept of racially mixed
urban schools in favor of upgrading the learning process in predominantly minority
schools. Decisionmakers must remember that integration, no matter how socially and
morally desirable it might be, remains a means to the paramount end of providing equal
825HeinOnline -- 54 Tex. L. Rev. 825 1975-1976
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Courts attempting to remedy interdistrict segregation may select
from several options. 22 First, absolute merger of the governing bodies
of two or more districts, the most drastic solution, might require a
minimum of continuing judicial supervision. Second, a pupil exchange
program between districts would provide an alternative to unduly com-
plicated consolidation, but might necessitate long-term court involve-
ment. Third, a partial merger could consolidate some but not all
educational services of several districts.23 Other available techniques
include ordering state officials to control directly the desegregation of
several districts and splicing segments of a predominantly black district
onto surrounding districts. Ultimately, a court also might defer to the
state legislature,2" which commands greater resources to rectify inter-
district racial imbalances.
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to establish criteria for
determining when courts may fashion interdistrict remedies. In Milli-
ken v. Bradley,2 5 a narrow five-to-four decision, the Court decided that
to invoke interdistrict remedies plaintiffs must first establish that (1) the
racially discriminatory acts of one district substantially caused segregat-
ed schools in another district,2 6 or (2) school officials deliberately drew
district lines on the basis of race.27 While clearly barring interdistrict
relief to desegregate schools outside these two narrow exceptions, Milli-
and maximum educational opportunities for all students. See generally N. ST. JOHN,
SCHOOL DEsEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHMLDREN 124-37 (1975).
22. See Symposium-Milliken v. Bradley and the Future of Urban School Desegre-
gation, 21 WAYNE L. Rav. 751, 782-90 (1975).
23. These compromise "umbrella districts," id. at 785, which stand between the usual
school district and the state board of education in the educational hierarchy, commonly
provide services too expensive for individual districts to furnish.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 '(7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1655 (1975); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D.
Del.), aff'd per curiam, 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975).
25. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken's implications for interdistrict remedies have
received intensive analysis. See, e.g., Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation
After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATHOLIc
U.L. Rav. 187 (1975); Symposium, supra note 22; Comment, supra note 16.
26. The substantial cause ground for interdistrict relief apparently requires a specific
and substantial causal connection between a constitutional transgression in one district
and a segregative ramification in another. See 418 U.S. at 745-48.
27. Justice Stewart's concurrence, which represented the crucial swing vote against
the lower court's inteadistrict plan, see Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), recognized a third ground for permitting such relief: namely, a finding that
state officials had purposefully contributed to discrimination through housing or zoning
legislation. 418 U.S. at 755. Concluding that official activity had not precipitated the
racial composition of Detroit's outlying school districts, Justice Stewart joined the
plurality in disapproving a multidistrict remedy for constitutional violations that had
occurred solely within the city. Id. at 756.
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ken's two-pronged test comprehends rather than repudiates earlier deci-
sions that under the fourteenth amendment condemned racially based
tampering with school district lines.28  Thus, despite Milliken's restric-
tive result, the Court might favor interdistrict relief29 when the facts
differ significantly from Milliken ° or when plaintiffs present different
evidence. 1
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond32 also illustrates
the rationale for limiting the power of courts to cast interdistrict relief.
While school district lines are not sacrosanct, especially when drawn
contrary to constitutional principles,38 neither are they inconsequential
demarcations subject to improvident judicial tinkering. In Richmond
the Fourth Circuit withheld interdistrict relief because it believed all
28. For example, in United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970),
aff'd and modified, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972),
State and local officials had perpetuated nine small, all-black school districts by tamper-
ing with certain student transfer and transportation regulations and by redrawing district
lines. Application of the first prong of the Milliken test, ascertaining the segregative
effect of one district upon another, would comport with the Texas court's consolidation
of the black districts with their neighboring districts. Moreover, Milliken's second
prong, which prohibits the redrawing of district boundaries to create or maintain
segregation, would also have compelled the interdistrict order. See also Haney v.
County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), which determined that the Arkansas
legislature's drawing of district lines to create an all-black district (at that time State law
required segregated schools) established de jure segregation as a matter of law, and thus
prompted a consolidation with other districts. The second Milliken test would also reach
the carving out of new school districts from existing ones where such a division impedes
integration of a segregated system. See, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of
Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972).
29. In fact, Milliken's majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, specifical-
ly reaffirmed the validity of several prior rulings. See 418 U.S. at 744.
30. Plaintiffs could seek less inclusive remedies, which, in subsuming fewer districts,
would arguably produce less educational upheaval. The burden of proving purposeful
isolationist treatment of a neighboring district, however, would remain formidable. See
Amaker, Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in School Desegregation
Cases, in CONFERENCE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COMm'N ON CrVIL RIGHTS,
MUKLiEN v. BRADLEY: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MErROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION 12-13 &
n.61 (1974).
31. The Milliken plaintiffs fatally omitted to allege specific interdistrict violations.
See 418 U.S. at 745. In the lower courts plaintiffs successfully argued that State-
encouraged segregation rendered Detroit schools de jure segregated. Bradley v. Milliken,
338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Before the Supreme Court, however, they
abandoned this promising approach, see note 27 supra, because of its novelty and instead
attempted to justify interdistrict relief under a more traditional de jure segregation
analysis. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 908.
32. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), al'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92
(1973) (Justice Powell not participating). The Fourth Circuit abrogated the district
court order that had consolidated a Richmond school district and two other districts in
an effort to achieve a greater degree of racial balance in the three systems.
33. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).
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three districts involved were operating unitary school systems, and that
no constitutional violations had occurred in the creation and mainten-
ance of those districts.3 4  Both Milliken and Richmond re-emphasized
Swann's equitable maxim that "the nature of the violation determines
the scope of the remedy. ' 8  The substantial, if poorly articulated,
limitation on equitable power apparently derives from principles of
federalism; both Milliken and Richmond stress the state's strong interest
in preserving local control of education against diminution by interdis-
trict remedies. 86
Current Milliken offspring, although significant, have embraced or
refused interdistrict remedies on the narrower basis of statutory interpre-
tation. In United States v. Board of School Commissioners of Indianap-
olis,81 the Seventh Circuit overturned a district court consolidation order
purportedly in harmony with State legislation that had merged several
municipalities into one metropolitan government. Because evidence
showed de jure segregation in only one district, the appellate court
ordered the lower court to determine on remand whether under Milliken
legislative creation of the metropolitan government without readjust-
ment of school district boundaries would warrant an interdistrict reme-
dy.38  Predictably, the Supreme Court declined to review Indianapolis;
on the other hand it chose to hear and in four words affirm Evans v.
Buchanan, 9 a three-judge district court's ruling that the exclusion of
one school district from a reorganization and consolidation statute con-
stitutes an interdistrict violation under Milliken.4"
By liberalizing rather than merely discussing and applying the
Milliken tests,41 United States v. Missouri42 augments the power of
federal courts to ordain interdistrict remedies. The Eighth Circuit
34. 462 F.2d at 1070.
35. 418 U.S. at 738; Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1061 (4th Cir. 1972).
36. The Fourth Circuit in Richmond asserted that the tenth amendment limits federal
equity power and that the state has near-plenary power over school districts and other
political subdivisions. 462 F.2d at 1068-69.
37. 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. CL 1655 (1975).
38. See id. at 85-86.
39. 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd per curiam, 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975).
40. The statute empowered the Delaware Board of Education to consolidate districts,
but expressly omitted Wilmington, a majority-black city surrounded by majority-white
suburbs, from the Board's reorganization domain. The court emphasized Justice Stew-
art's third requirement for interdistrict violations, see note 27 supra, and determined that
the Educational Advancement Act fostered a separation of races by authorizing school
redistricting. See 393 F. Supp. at 445-46.
41. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
42. 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 374 (1975).
828
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readily accepted the trial court's conclusion that State and local officials,
through the establishment of the Berkeley district, discriminatorily creat-
ed the segregated Kinloch district.43 Under Milliken, this determination
clearly justified judicially ordered consolidation of Berkeley and Kin-
loch,44 but the inclusion of Ferguson in the remedy erected a potential
roadblock. Ferguson's boundary lines had no racial foundation, and
Ferguson did not actively participate in segregating Kinloch. None-
theless, the circuit court affirmed as not clearly erroneous the district
court's finding that Ferguson "unlawfully maintained" Kinloch as a
segregated district.45  Apparently Ferguson's constitutional violation
sprang from either its admitted inaction46 or a 1949 referendum that
rejected a reorganization plan that had included Kinloch.47
The Eighth Circuit sanctioned the lower court's reading of
Milliken-federal courts can and must implement interdistrict remedies
43. ia. at 1369. Kinloch has continually provided educational opportunities sub-
stantially inferior to those offered in Berkeley, Ferguson, and most other school
districts in the county. Id. at 1367. Kinloch's boundary lines have remained frozen,
although its small size, educational deficiencies, and low assessed valuation have made it
a conspicuous candidate for reorganization with other districts. Studies commissioned by
the State and county uniformly recommended consolidation, and in 1967 the Kinloch
board asked the county to apportion it and any other district. United States v. Missouri,
363 F. Supp. 739, 745 (E.D. Mo. 1973). Nevertheless, with one exception in 1949, see
note 47 infra & accompanying text, State and county officials excluded Kinloch from
their numerous reorganization plans, ostensibly because they believed the surrounding
districts would reject consolidation with an all-black district.
44. Both the district court and court of appeals summarily dismissed Berkeley's
several protests, among them that it presently operates a unitary school system and that
including it in the annexation would both financially burden its own black residents and
contribute nothing toward desegregating Kinloch. See 515 F.2d at 1368.
45. Id. at 1370.
46. The Eighth Circuit rubber-stamped the district court's conclusion that "[t]his is
an instance where the failure to act or resistance for discriminatory reasons to actions
tending to correct segregation amounted to a constitutional wrong." Id. Observing that
county and State officials had improperly excluded Kinloch from reorganization, the
Missouri court reasoned that past intentional segregation may justify condemning present
inaction that has effectively maintained segregation. Id., citing Oliver v. Michigan State
Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974). The opinion referred to Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U:S. 189, 211-12 (1973), for the presumption that intentional
segregative acts within the system constitute de jure segregation, even if those transgres-
sions antedate the construction of the offending schools. School authorities must rebut
this prima facie incrimination by proving that the past acts did not contribute to the
present situation. The de jure presumption, however, should not apply to Ferguson,
which, unlike the officials and the Berkeley district, did not activeky commit past
segregative wrongdoings.
47. Several districts voted; the vote in Ferguson was tied. S'ee 515 F.2d at 1370.
Since 1948 virtually every district near Kinloch has grown through reorganization or
annexation, perhaps in the belief that larger districts can operate more efficiently and
can provide greater educational opportunities. Kinloch, however, has remained the same
size. See note 43 supra.
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if district lines obstruct the exercise of constitutional rights. Including
Ferguson in the consolidation order, whether under the inaction or
referendum theory, arguably relies upon the "interdistrict effect" test. In
addition, the court distinguished Milliken on its facts, observing
that, unlike the metropolitan desegregation plan urged for Detroit,
the St. Louis County three-district scheme substantially assimilated Mis-
souri law and would not foster extensive educational disruption.4 8  If
Ferguson's indifference toward its neighboring segregated school district
constitutes an interdistrict violation, then Milliken does not merit the
constrictive view of interdistrict relief attributed to it.49
The court's interpretation of Milliken parallels the Seventh Cir-
cuif's in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,5" which characterized
Milliken not as an absolute prohibition on interdistrict remedies in the
absence of interdistrict violations but as a command to implement
practical remedies where needed.51 Having concluded that the defend-
ants' discriminatory site selection and tenant assignment policies ren-
dered public housing throughout Chicago de jure segregated, the Gau-
treaux court ordered the building of public housing units in
predominantly white, suburban neighborhoods. Gautreaux focused on
residential segregation at the metropolitan level and condemned discrim-
inatory abuses in public housing programs. Missouri, in essence, chan-
nels Gautreaux's pragmatic interpretation of Milliken into the school
desegregation arena.
Missouri thus understands Milliken as a restraint only on interdis-
trict remedies that pose functional problems similar to those inherent in
the metropolitan Detroit plan.52  The Eighth Circuit's opinion furnishes
flexible guidelines for revamping segregated school districts that have
not engaged in traditional de jure misconduct. Missouri itself illustrates
the advantages of its more elastic approach-its three-district plan offers
48. See 515 F.2d at 1370; note 5 supra & accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAPv. L REv. 13, 61 (1974);
Comment, supra note 16.
50. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), af'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 44 U.S.L.W.
4480 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1976). For a detailed analysis of Gautreaux's handling of
Milliken, gee Note, 43 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 633 (1975); Note, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 135;
Note, 21. VILL. L. REv. 115 (1975). See generally Kushner & Werner, supra note 25.
51. Justice Tom Clark, sitting by designation and writing for the Gautreaux court,
understood Milliken to indicate that the proposed Detroit multidistrict plan overreacted
to a single district violation. See 503 F.2d at 935-36.
52. The Supreme Court determined that the Detroit desegregation plan would
disrupt the State educational structure by diminishing local control over education and
would create massive problems of administration, transportation, and finance. 418 U.S.
at 742-43.
830
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meaningful integration without imposing extreme administrative or
financial burdens. Because of its limited scale, the St. Louis County
plan arguably neither significantly increases busing needs nor diminishes
local control of education.
Missouri's limitation of Milliken meshes with the results in two
other recent interdistrict cases, 58 reinforcing the notion that the ap-
propriateness of court-ordered interdistrict relief turns on practical con-
siderations unique to the particular school systems under review. The
consolidation plan rejected in Richmond54 envisioned an unwieldy super
district, which would have created financial and tax problems, as well as
significantly diluting community control over education.5 5 On the other
hand, the Sixth Circuit in Newburg Area Council v. Board of
Education56 accepted a three-district metropolitan plan that neither
presented major administrative problems nor altered the structure of
public education envisioned under Kentucky law.
Missouri's facts present Milliken in microcosm, yet tension arises
between the two decisions57 as the result of their divergent standards for
identifying de jure segregation. Milliken requires that racially discrimi-
natory acts have produced an interdistrict segregative effect before a
53. See notes 54-56 infra & accompanying text.
54. See notes 32-36 supra & accompanying text.
55. See 462 F.2d at 1066-67. The Fourth Circuit also observed that consolidation
would ignore Virginia's structuring of "free school systems." Id.
56. 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reaffd per
curiam, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 'U.S. 931 (1975) (school
district lines traversable when necessary to remove the vestiges of state-imposed segrega-
tion). The Newburg court's distinguishing of Milliken on its facts paralleled the
techniques utilized in Missouri and Gautreaux. The Sixth Circuit perceived six material
differences: (1) unlike Milliken, all the school districts included in the remedy had
unlawfully operated de jure segregated systems; (2) the remedy encompassed only two or
three districts in a single county, necessitating nominal changes, whereas Milliken
involved fifty-four districts; (3) under Kentucky law the county, not the school district,
forges the basic educational unit; (4) consolidation under the metropolitan remedy could
proceed under express provisions of a Kentucky statute, obviating Milliken's attendant
administrative difficulties; (5) all the implicated school authorities had ignored school
district lines in maintaining school segregation, while only two of the fifty-four Detroit
districts were suspect; and (6) the Louisville School District had not expanded with
the city's political boundaries, thereby intensifying segregation. 510 F.2d at 1359-61.
Newburg questioned whether a federal court could consolidate de jure segregated
districts; the issue, however, did not reach the Supreme Court because the districts in
question voluntarily consolidated. NEWSwEEK, Sept. 8, 1975, at 79.
57. The Chief Justice's majority opinion in Milliken implicitly recognized a substan-
tive barrier to interdistrict relief, impregnable even where consolidation appears reasona-
ble---constitutional principles "cannot vary in accordance with the size or population
dispersal of the particular city, county, or school district." 418 U.S. at 747 n.22.
Obviously, the Missouri court conceived the Supreme Court's observation as less than
dispositive.
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court may order interdistrict relief.5 s In Missouri, however, Ferguson's
failure to consolidate with Kinloch might not qualify as an interdistrict
violation under that formula. Clearly, Ferguson's inaction 9 precipitat-
ed the requisite effect, for consolidation would have terminated Kin-
loch's social isolation. On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit may have
improperly supplied the missing variable-the acts-by characterizing
the failure to merge as "racially discriminatory," i.e., intentional.
Milliken does not address the issue of segregative intent. The
Supreme Court in Keyes v. School District Number 161 stated "that the
differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate."'6 The Keyes test
does not, however, evaluate the subjective intention that motivated
action resulting in segregation; rather courts commonly infer in-
tent from the results of those actions."2 While the segregative intent
58. See id. at 744-45.
59. As used in this note and by the Eighth Circuit, the term "inaction" refers to
Ferguson's lack of involvement in creating or maintaining the obviously unconstitutional
structure of the neighboring school districts. The only evidence of positive action taken
by Ferguson was the referendum vote not to annex Kinloch. See 515 F.2d at 1370; note
47 supra & accompanying text. The Missouri court made little mention of this vote,
which, although representing a choice by the district's residents, would not support a
finding of segregative action under Milliken. The private exercise of the ballot does not
in itself constitute action by the state or its officials, dispensing with a necessary
ingredient of a fourteenth amendment violation. Furthermore, the county board of
education's decision to submit the reorganization to the electorate in accordance with
state law apparently does not violate the equal protection clause. Compare Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (ordinance requiring referendums for racial housing
matters denies equal protection), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (manda-
tory referendums for low-rent housing comport with the Constitution). Even if the
board's use of the referendum procedure represents wrongdoing on its part, the infraction
does not reflect on Ferguson.
60. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
61. Id. at 208 (emphasis in original).
62. "[A] presumption of segregative intent arises once it is established that school
authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and foreseeable
consequence of which is to bring about or maintain segregation." United States v.
School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 535-36 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 361 (1975). See
generally Note, 55 NEB. L. REv. 144, 148-50, 153-59 (1975).
With respect to interdistrict violations, one court has inferred segregative intent
when a district consolidation plan proposed by school officials would foreseeably
perpetuate segregated schools. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1975). The State had no affirmative duty to de-
segregate because it had never operated a dual system; still the court mandated that
any restructuring reverse rather than promote existing racial polarity. In northern states
where school segregation never received legal sanction, courts nevertheless discern dejure segregation through an "effects" theory analysis. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See
also Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972). The Gautreaux
court determined that the extensive placement of public housing projects in black
residential areas evidenced segregative intent. See 503 F.2d at 933.
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test has various formulations,63 courts invariably focus on positive ac-
tions in determining whether the requisite intent exists. Inferring intent
from inaction, as in Missouri, appears more tenuous. Severe difficulties
inhere in any bona fide attempt to determine why an action was not
taken." In Missouri the Eighth Circuit simply assumed that Ferguson
intended the segregative effect of its inaction; consequently the court
easily clothed Ferguson's inaction in discriminatory garb.
Missouri breaks new ground in treating inaction as interdistrict de
jure segregation. Although courts have determined that inaction may
constitute discriminatory conduct within a single district," inaction has
never itself generated a finding of interdistrict violation. Prior cases
suggest that official inaction offends the Constitution only when the
officials owe an affirmative duty to desegregate.,6  Clearly, in Milliken
and Richmond the suburban districts had refused to aid the segregated
urban schools, but lacking a duty to desegregate, they successfully
parried accusations of unconstitutional misconduct. Ferguson's posi-
tion warrants similar immunity. Having committed no positive segrega-
tive acts, Ferguson need not have heeded the directive to desegregate
Kinloch. The Eighth Circuit misconstrued the fourteenth amendment
implications of Ferguson's inaction and, in so doing, significantly re-
laxed the standard for finding de jure segregation. Missouri's inaction
concept extends an affirmative duty to desegregate to virtually every
school district adjacent to a segregated district. 1
63. See Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern School-
house Doors, 9 HARv. Crv. RiGorrs-Crv. Lo. L. R.v. 124, 149 (1974).
64. See Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972).
65. See, e.g., Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971);
People v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th
Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
66. An affirmative duty attaches to school authorities who commit positive acts of
discrimination and, consequently, operate de jure segregated schools. See Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The Supreme Court in Swam v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973), implied that inaction for racial reasons may constitute de jure segregation,
but in both cases the defendant school officials already managed de jure segregated
school systems and thereby triggered an affirmative duty to integrate. While under the
Missouri facts Berkeley owed the same duty toward Kinloch, Ferguson did not. Other
lower court cases finding inaction unconstitutional also concentrate on the de jure
context. See, e.g., Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
413 U.S. 189 (1973). But cf. Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y.
1962); People v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658
(4th Dist. 1971) (dictum), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
67. Practicality as well as theoretical consistency dictate that interdistrict remedies
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No workable narrowing of the Missouri inaction concept appears
feasible. The Eighth Circuit implied that inaction warrants condemna-
tion only in the absence of nonracial justification, an imprecise and
unwieldy theory in light of the multifarious potential justifications avail-
able to defendants: for example, failure to consider action, lack of
authority, increased tax burdens, costs of planning and administering
reorganization, and dilution of local control over schools. Moreover, to
sanction the federal courts' emergence as educational planners presup-
poses their adroitness as school superintendents, a function far beyond
traditional judicial competence.
The Missouri decision, although unique in its determination that
discriminatory acts within one school district substantially implicate
interdistrict effects, does stand on another, more solid ground. Other
interdistrict rulings have used violations at the state agency level to
justify correctives that cross district lines.6 8 The trial court in Missouri
concluded that the State and county boards of education had acted
unlawfully by failing to desegregate Kinloch.69 The school boards not
only must fulfill their statutory duty to reorganize school districts70 but
also must comply with the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against
state-supported segregation. Consequently, failure to reorganize dis-
tricts to eliminate de jure segregation constitutes unlawful inaction, a
violation interdistrict in scope. Proper relief could require the reorgani-
zation of all districts that the boards of education, had they acted
properly, might have reorganized with the segregated district. This
theory, by dispensing with the need to detect constitutional violations on
the part of districts included within the remedy, justifies Ferguson's
reorganization with Kinloch and Berkeley without an artificial finding
that Ferguson had acted unconstitutionally. 71 Basing the interdistrict
should not ensue from the mere inaction of neighboring school districts. Forcing one
school district to integrate with another offends practical sensibilities because one district
has no authority to reorganize another and can merely make proposals. For social and
economic reasons the segregated district may reject the overtures of a district charged
with the affirmative duty. The facts of Missouri illustrate the anomaly; Kinloch opposed
a plan calling for its annexation with Ferguson. 515 F.2d at 1368.
68. See, e.g., Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920, 923-24 (8th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1057 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd and modified,
447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
69. See note 43 supra & accompanying text.
70. The St. Louis County Board of Education and the State Board of Education
share responsibility foi developing school district reorganization plans for St. Louis
County. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 161.152, 162.161, 162.181 (1959).
71. In some circumstances courts must either compel consolidation of districts that
have not committed violations or deny any relief. Suppose county officials discriminato-
rily refuse to include a de facto segregated district in reorganization plans. The only
appropriate solution requires some form of interdistrict consolidation. Because the
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remedy on violations at the state and county level greatly reduces the
friction between Missouri and Milliken by eliminating the restrictions
conceivably placed on Milliken's standard by the Eighth Circuit. More-
over, the strategy of prosecuting state agencies that supervise local
districts promises success in other settings because the educational sys-
tem under siege in Missouri sufficiently resembles that found in various
other states.72
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, while suggesting that the
Missouri decision melds with Milliken,7 leaves the basic inconsistency
of the two cases unresolved. If the facts of Missouri justify its different
result, Milliken enjoys narrower applicability than has been supposed; it
might only prohibit administratively unreasonable remedies, or even
constitute a procedural rule simply requiring that neighboring districts
receive a meaningful opportunity to present evidence on the question of
constitutional violations or the propriety of a multidistrict remedy.7 4
Alternatively, courts can reconcile Missouri with Milliken by broadening
the requisites to invoke interdistrict relief.75  Hopefully, future cases will
either articulate the scope of the affirmative duty to integrate or estab-
lish a workable rule for determining when state or district inaction con-
stitutes unlawful racial discrimination.
Missouri court adopted the desegregation plan proposed by the State and county boards,
its action arguably ratifies the authorities' proposal rather than evinces its own
initiative. In fact, the United States contended that by ordering the three-district plan
the district court did not intervene but merely enabled State and county officials to meet
their responsibilities. Brief for Appellee at 41-42, United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d
1365 (8th Cir. 1975). "School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidat-
ing, assessing, and solving . . . [desegregation] problems; courts will have to consider
whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299
(1955).
72. See Comment, supra note 20, at 790-92, 805; Note, supra note 19, at 1304.
73. After Milliken, Supreme Court observers predicted an era of retrenchment in the
school desegregation area. See note 25 supra. The more conservative Court, however,
has continued rather than arrested the judicial activism exemplified by its decisions from
Green through Keyes.
74. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 717.
75. Due to demographic trends, school segregation is developing an increasingly
interdistrict character. See generally N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 25, col. 4. Interdistrict
remedies will necessarily play a larger part in any viable desegregation policy. The
educational system sorely needs a coherent interdistrict standard. Whatever the ultimate
standard, school district lines should not suffer casual crossing or discarding, because
they protect the vital social interest in community control of public education; neither
should they supply an invulnerable defense for de jure segregation.
[Note by James Charles Smith.]
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